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Abstract 
Previous empirical studies have found a positive relationship between the size of the 
legislature  and  the  size  of  government.  Those  studies,  however,  do  not  adequately 
address  the  concerns  of  endogeneity.  In  contrast,  this  paper  exploits  an  exogenous 
variation in the size of the legislature induced by a statutory law linking council size to 
the  number  of  eligible  voters  in  Swedish  local  governments.  The  statutory  law  can 
potentially create discontinuities between number of eligible voters and council size at 
certain known values. These discontinuities are used to construct instrumental variable 
estimates  of  the  effect  of  council  size  on  government  size.  In  contrast  to  previous 
findings, the results show that an increase of the council size leads to a statistically and 
economically significant decrease in spending and revenues. On average, spending and 
revenues are decreased by roughly 0.5-0.8 percent for each additional council member.  
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Recent  empirical  research  has  found  a  positive  relationship  between  the  number  of 
legislators and the size of government.
1 But these studies raise problems of endogeneity. 
A potential omitted variable problem is that both council size and the size of government 
could be related to voter preferences. Riker (1980) argues that political institutions no 
longer suiting a majority of voters will be overturned and therefore all institutions simply 
reflect the “congealed preferences” of the electorate and contain no information other 
than on voter preferences. Put differently, this is an example of a potential self-selection 
problem on the basis of unobserved characteristics.
2 There may also be a simultaneity 
problem since both the size of government and the size of the legislature are results of 
choices made by legislatures. The omitted variable problem can potentially be solved by 
including controls for voter preferences in the regression of interest. But preferences are 
unobserved  and  generically  difficult  to  measure.  Thus,  to  convincingly  address  the 
endogeneity  problem  requires  a  source  of  exogenous  variation  in  the  number  of 
legislators making possible an instrumental variable approach.  
The first contribution of this paper is to make use of an exogenous source of 
variation in the number of legislators induced by a statutory law linking council size to 
the  number  of  eligible  voters  in  Swedish  local  governments.  The  law  prescribes  a 
minimum requirement of council size in relation to the number of eligible voters: if the 
number of eligible voters is less or equal to 12,000 the council must consist of at least 31 
members; if the number of eligible voters is larger than 12,000 but less or equal to 24,000 
the law states that council size must be no less than 41; if the number of eligible voters is 
over 24,000 but less or equal to 36,000 then the size must be at least 51, and finally if the 
number of eligible voters is over 36,000 the size must be at least 61. The law can now 
potentially induce three discontinuities between the number of eligible voters and the size 
of the council at the levels of 12,000, 24,000 and 36,000 of eligible voters. For instance, 
                                                 
1 The studies by Baqir (2001), Bradbury and Crain (2001), and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001) all 
find  a  positive  effect  on  the  number  of  legislators  and  government  size.  The  work  by  Perotti  and 
Kontpoulos (2002) also find a positive effect but they use number of ministers in the cabinet instead of the 
number of legislators. 
2 The general selection problem is subject of an extensive literature. For example, see Heckman and Robb 





suppose  that  one  locality  had  12,000  eligible  voters  and  choose  to  have  31  council 
members, i.e., the smallest required size.  Suppose further that the number of eligible 
voters increased with one, i.e., to 12,001, then the locality is forced by the law to increase 
its council size to at least 41. In other words, a small change in the number of eligible 
voters causes a discontinuous jump in the council size. The idea is now to use these 
discontinuities, as the exogenous source of variation, to explicitly construct instrumental 
variables. The logic behind this identification strategy is that there is a discontinuous 
relationship between council size and number of eligible voters at certain known levels 
whereas there is a smooth relationship between the number of eligible voters and the size 
of government. 
A second contribution of this article is to explicitly introduce the language and 
conceptual framework of randomized experiments and to illustrate how we may combine 
three  different  kinds  of  empirical  identification  strategies:  instrumental  variables, 
regression-discontinuity  design  and  fixed  effects  in  an  attempt  to  approximate  the 
evidence generated by a true experiment. In other words, the council size law provides 
something close to a random assignment, or a so called “natural experiment” which gives 
rise  to  interesting  methodological  and  practical  issues  in  implementing  empirical 
strategies.  
Apart from the natural experiment provided by the council size law there are other 
attractive features of using Swedish local governments as a testing ground. As Sweden is 
a unitary state local governments operate under the same constitutional and institutional 
setting. Thus, the variation due to the council size law is not confounded with variation of 
other  institutional  factors  that  might  be  related  to  both  council  size  and  the  size  of 
government since these are implicitly “held constant”. We also have access to a huge 
panel data set, consisting of 288 local governments from 1974 to 1998, which means that 
we can both use the cross-sectional and time-series variation to identify the effect of 
council size on government size. Swedish local governments also have the constitutional 
right  of  self-government,  they  have  no  restrictions  on  borrowing,  and  they  have  no 
balanced budget rules.
3 Moreover, only 20 percent of their revenues are from grants, 
whereas the bulk comes from a proportional income tax, which each municipality can set 
                                                 





freely. In other words, they have a large degree of freedom in fiscal policy, which has 
resulted  in  quite  large  differences  in  policy  outcomes  across  the  local  governments.
4 
Finally, Swedish local governments also play a significant role in the Swedish Economy. 
During the sample period their total expenditures amounted to roughly 20-25 percent of 
GDP.  This  makes  them  more  economically  significant  than  most  other  sub-national 
government around the world. 
When  using  a  standard  regression  control  methodology,  I  find  a  positive 
association between the size of the legislature and the size of government, as did previous 
studies. But I find a negative relationship when the instrumental variable method is used 
in order to  account for  unobserved heterogeneity  and simultaneity. These two results 
together  suggest  that  the  previous  studies  might  be  subject  to  omitted-variable  and 
simultaneity problems. 
This  paper  is  related  to  a  broader  literature  about  the  empirical  relationship 
between political institutions, broadly defined as the rules by which decisions are made 
and economic or policy outcomes.
5 However, few of these studies discuss the potential 
problem of endogenous institutions, and very rarely try to address it.
6  
This paper is also related to the literature about social interactions.
7 The goal of 
this  literature  is  to  provide  an  explanation  of  group  behavior,  which  emerges  from 
interdependences across individuals. The interactions among budget decisions makers are 
a specific example of such interdependences. This literature also provides a thorough 
discussion about the inferential problems in detecting the existence and estimating the 
magnitude  of  social  interactions.  The  empirical  approach  put  forward  in  this  paper 
suggests one way to circumvent these problems. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2, presents a simple model of why 
we  should  expect  the  number  of  legislature  to  be  positively  related  to  the  size  of 
government. Section 3 discusses the problem of causal inference and how this relates to 
the previous studies. This section also present the empirical strategy used to estimate the 
causal relationship between the size of the legislature and the size of government. Section 
                                                 
4 In a series of papers of mine, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001, 2002a, 2002b) and Dahlberg and Pettersson-
Lidbom (2002), I also find strong support for Swedish local policy discretion. 
5 See Poterba and Von Hagen (1999) and Besley and Case (2002) for surveys. 
6 See, however, Persson and Tabellini (2002).  





4 describes the data used in the analysis, while section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
discusses the interpretations of the findings and section 7 concludes. 
2. Model 
Why should we expect the size of the legislature to be related to the size of government? 
The literature about the “common-pool” problem suggests one answer.
8 To illustrate the 
common-pool problem we use a simple model by Persson and Tabellini (2000). Let N 
denote  the  number  of  legislators  assuming  each  legislator  l  to  have  quasi-linear 
preferences 
wl= cl + H (gl), 
where cl denotes the consumption of private goods, gl the per capita supply of a publicly 
provided good, and H is an increasing and concave function with H(0)=0. Thus, in this 
set-up public good gl only benefits legislator l. Each legislator represents a certain group 
of  people,  where  groups  can  be  defined  according  to  preferences,  occupation, 
geographical location, age or any other personal attributes. All legislators have the same 
income y. A unit of income can be costlessly converted into one unit of any of the N 
publicly provided goods. We assume that all these goods are financed out of a common 
pool of tax revenues, where each group contributes the same amount 
￿  (i.e., a lump sum 
tax). We also assume that each legislator decides freely on the supply of each public 
good, whereas the tax rate is residually determined.
9 This creates a distorted incentive for 
each individual legislator since all groups share the cost of financing the public good. Put 
differently,  each  legislator  would  like  to  overspend  on  her  particular  good  since  she 
shares the cost of providing this good with the other legislators.  
This  type  of  incentive  problem  that  arise  from  centralized  financing  can  be 




l wl, subject to the resource constraint 
￿
l (cl +gl)=Ny: 
Hg (g
u)=1.                                                              (1) 
Thus, the equilibrium condition is to set the marginal benefit of each good equal to the 
marginal cost of unity. In contrast, when each legislator decides freely on the supply of 
                                                 
8 The classic reference is Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981). 
9 This collective choice procedure is known as universalism (e.g., Weingast 1979). This type of collective 





“her own” public good but the taxes are residually determined each legislator maximizes 
y-
￿ +H (gl) = y-1/N 
￿
l gl +H (gl) with respect to gl taking equilibrium spending by all other 





                                                                                    (2) 
This equilibrium is characterized by overspending compared to utilitarian optimum, i.e., 
g
c> g
u. This result is the well-known common-pool problem where each legislator fully 
internalizes the benefit of its own good, but she internalizes only the fraction 1/N of the 
social marginal cost of higher taxes. Thus, the prediction from this model is that the 
larger the number of legislators the larger is the size of government. 
  Obviously,  this  model  of  the  budget  making  process  is  highly  stylized.  In 
particular, individual legislators make all budget decisions without taking into account 
the role of political parties. However, the main prediction from the model: the larger the 
number  of  decision  makers  in  the  budget  process  the  larger  the  size  of  government; 
should also be valid in a strong party system such as the Swedish one.
10 This issue is 
further discussed in section 6.  
3. Causal inference and empirical strategy 
In the previous section, I presented a simple model of why the size of the legislature can 
have  an  effect  on  the  size  of  government.  In  this  section,  I  discuss  the  empirical 
conditions that need to be fulfilled to conclude that there exists a causal relationship 
between the size of the legislature and the size of government, and how earlier studies 
have tried to tackle the issue of causality. Then I present the empirical strategy used in 
this paper to address the whether the number of legislators is causally related to the size 
of government.  
The equilibrium condition from the common pool model, as expressed in equation 
2, predicts a positive relationship between the size of government and the number of 
                                                 
10 Inman and Fitts (1990) incorporate parties into the common pool model and show that the result of an 





legislators.  If  we  make  a  linear  approximation  to  the  f.o.c,
11  we  have  the  following 
outcome equation of interest 
 
gi= a + dNi + Xitb + ei,                                                   (3) 
 
where i indexes a unit such as countries, states or cities. X is a vector of observable 
variables that might be both related to gi and Ni. The parameter of interest is the council-
size effect d, which measures the ceteris paribus effect of adding an additional legislator 
on the size of government.  
We can make causal inference if the error term ei is independent of the size of the 
legislature Ni, a condition which can be stated as E[e | N] = 0. In applied research this 
condition usually fails in one of four ways: omitted variables, selection, measurement 
error, or simultaneity. In our case omitted variables, selection and simultaneity are the 
prime concerns. For example, in the cross section study by Baqir (2002) unobserved city 
characteristics such as voter preferences might be related both to the size of government 
and the size of the city council. Using a panel of cities and controlling for fixed city 
effects would solve any time invariant omitted-variable problem. This is the estimation 
strategy used by Bradbury and Crain (2001) for a cross-country data set, and Gilligan and 
Matsusaka (1995) for the U.S. states. However, their estimation strategy only works if 
there  is  any  non-trivial  variation  across  time  in  the  size  of  the  legislature,  since  the 
inclusion  of  fixed  unit  effects  makes  it  impossible  to  identify  any  time  invariant 
institutional  factor.  The  fixed-effect  estimation  strategy,  however,  does  not  solve  the 
problem  of  simultaneity,  namely  that  the  size  of  the  legislature  and  the  size  of 
government  could  be  determined  simultaneously.  Nor  does  a  fixed-effect  estimation 
strategy  solve  a  time  varying  omitted  variables  problem,  such  as  a  change  in  voter 
preferences which might give rise to the problem of endogenous institution pointed out 
by Riker (1980). These empirical problems also make it difficult to predict the sign of the 
potential  bias.  For  example,  the  omitted-variable  problem  due  to  unobserved  voter 
preferences could generate both upward and downward biased estimates depending on 
                                                 
11 Of course, the f.o.c is non-linear, but all previous studies have implicitly assumed a linear regression 
model with constant coefficients and I will also retain these assumptions. Nevertheless, I will also discuss 





the true correlation between voter preferences and the size of government and the size of 
the legislature respectively.  
One solution to the endogeneity problems is to conduct an experiment in which 
the size of the legislature is randomly assigned. Random assignment would eliminate any 
dependence between the size of legislature and the error term. Even though we cannot 
conduct  a  randomized  experiment,  we  can  use  a  natural  experiment  to  generate 
instrumental variables that effectively do the same thing.
12    
An instrumental variable Zi should fulfill two requirements: instrument relevance 
and instrument exogeneity. The first condition states that the instrument must be partially 
correlated with the size of the legislature Ni once all other exogenous variables included 
in equation (1) have been netted out. This condition can be formally expressed as Ni =
￿ 0 
+ 
￿ 1 Zi + Xi
￿  + ui, and 
￿ 1 
￿  0. The second condition states that the instrument must be 
independent of the regression error, i.e., E[e | Z ] = 0.
13  
Baqir  (2002)  is  the  only  previous  study  that  uses  an  instrumental  variable 
approach to solve the endogenity problems. He uses the size of the city council in 1960, 
i.e., Zi=Ni,t-30,  as the instrument. There is a problem with this instrument if unobserved 
city characteristics are persistent over time. If such a variable are not accounted for in the 
regression the instrument and the error term become correlated, i.e., E[e | Z ]
￿ 0.
14  
In this paper, I will use an attractive instrumental variable to solve the endogenity 
problem. In Swedish local governments, the size of the local council is partly determined 
by statutory law. The law prescribes a minimum council size in relation to the number of 
eligible  voters.  Table  1  shows  the  relationship  between  council  size  and  number  of 
eligible voters. The law states that the number of council members must be at least 31, 
41, 51 and 61 depending on whether the number of eligible voters in a local government 
falls into one of four intervals. Thus, the law potentially induces three discontinuities in 
the size of the council: at the number of 12,000, 24,000 and 36,000 of eligible voters. The 
                                                 
12 See Angrist and Kreuger (2001) for an introduction of using natural experiments to construct 
instrumental variables. 
13 If the structural relationship of interest is linear then the instruments need only to be uncorrelated with 
the error term.   
14 In more general terms, Baqir’s instrument is an example of using institutions that date back in time as the 
exogenous source variation. The argument is that those institutions should be less susceptible to concerns 
about endogeneity than more recent institutions. However, there is no compelling reason to believe that this 





idea is to use these discontinuities as instrumental variables. One way of constructing the 
instrumental variables is by dividing the municipalities into 4 groups and use a set of 







36,000], and Z61 =1[v>36,000] where v is the number of eligible voters 
and the sub-indices refer to the minimum required council size within each group. Since 
the instruments are mutually orthogonal indicator variables, it is possible to construct 
distinct  IV  or  Wald  estimates  of  the  council-size  effect  (Angrist  1991).  Thus,  it  is 
possible to construct three different estimates of the council-size effect since there are 
three linearly independent dummy variables. However, if we are willing to assume that 
the council-size effect is linear and constant across all units i (which is implicitly what we 
have done in equation 3) we can use a Two-Stage-Least-Square (TSLS) procedure to 
form a single TSLS estimate.
 The TSLS estimate is a weighted average of each of the 
instrumental variables estimates obtained taking the instruments one by one. This is the 
most  efficient  TSLS  estimator  in  homoscedastic  regression  models  with  constant 
coefficients (Newey 1990). 
The use of multiple instruments can also have drawbacks. In case that the second 
condition for instrument validity is violated, namely if the instruments are only weakly 
correlated with the endogenous regressor, the IV estimator will be biased.
15 The larger 
the number of instruments the larger is the bias.  The instrumental variable estimate will 
be biased towards the OLS estimate (Sawa 1969). Put differently, there is going to be a 
trade-off between bias and efficiency as the number of instruments increases. 
One  potential  solution to  the  weak  instrument  problem  is  to  use  combine  the 
dummy instruments into a single instrument. In this case the bias is approximately zero 
since the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous variables (Angrist 
and Kreuger 2001). This instrument is most naturally constructed as linear combination 
of the previous instruments: Z=1*Z31+2*Z41+3*Z51+4*Z61 (e.g. equivalent to Z=31*Z31+ 
41*Z41+51*Z51+61*Z61), since these are discrete and uniformly distributed.  
A useful way of thinking about this particular way of constructing instrumental 
variables  is  to  make  a  comparison  with  the  treatment  literature.  We  can  think  of 
                                                 





legislature size as a multi-valued treatment.
16 Since the treatment can be partly chosen by 
the municipalities there can only be partial compliance to the treatment protocol. In such 
a case the assigned treatment level can serve as an instrumental variable for the actual 
treatment  level,  which  is  precisely  the  reason  for  why  I  use  the  council-size  law  to 
construct instrumental variables. 
The use of instrumental variables to solve the endogenity problem also raises the 
issue of the interpretation of the estimated parameter of interest, i.e., the council-size 
effect. Here, we can again draw on the treatment literature. This literature has defined 
four different causal effects: average treatment effect (ATE), treatment on the treated 
effect  (TT),  local  average  treatment  effect  (LATE),  and  marginal  treatment  effect 
(MTE).
17  It  turns  out  that  these  effects  coincide  if  the  treatment  effect  is  linear  and 
constant across all units, as we have assumed above. However, if this is not the case the 
exogeneity assumption  of the instruments alone is usually not sufficient to identify  a 
meaningful treatment effect. Instead, one needs to make additional assumptions about 
how the instrument  affects the participation or  selection into treatment.  For example, 
random  assignment  into  treatment  and  control  groups  and  full  compliance  to  the 
treatment protocol identifies the ATE. In our case, if the constant treatment assumption 
fails,  the  council  size  effect  will  be  identified  as  TT  since  there  is  a  population  of 
municipalities that is denied to take certain treatments because of the council size law.
18 
An  important  issue  in  constructing  instrumental  variables  is  whether  the 
assumption about instrument exogeneity is plausible. In other words, we need to isolate 
the part of variation in council size that is arguably exogenous, or the “as if” random 
source  of  variation.  Here,  we  will  make  use  of  an  empirical  strategy  known  as  a 
regression-discontinuity design to isolate the random variation. If the council size was 
entirely determined by the council-size law we would not need to use an instrumental 
variable approach since we could just compare the average outcome of municipalities 
slightly above a certain discontinuity with those slightly above. The reason for this is that 
one can think of regression-discontinuity design as mimicking a tie-breaking randomized 
experiment, namely to toss a fair coin at some known pre-treatment value. For example, 
                                                 
16 The potential values are NÎ{31, 33, 35,…, J}  
17 See Heckman (2001) for a discussion of the different effects. 





if we could toss a coin when the number of eligible voters is exactly at 12,000, and assign 
municipalities with head 31 council members, and municipalities with tail 41 members. 
Now we can compare the average size of government across the two different treatment 
groups. If there is a difference in the average outcome we could causally attribute it to the 
size of the legislature since the treatment is randomly assigned.
19 However, since the 
council-size  law  only  influences  but  not  entirely  determines  the  actual  size  we  will 
estimate the council-size effect by instrumental variable regression, where the “as if” 
random  source  of  variation  provides  the  instrumental  variable.  It  is  the  three 
discontinuities  at  12,000,  24,000  and  36,000  eligible  voters  that  provides  the  “as  if” 
random variation in council size, i.e., small changes in the number of eligible voters 
potentially induce large changes in the council size at these predetermined levels due to 
the law. Thus, these discontinuities are used to construct instrumental variable estimates 
of  the  effect  of  council  size  on  government  size.  Practically,  we  can  implement  the 
regression-discontinuity  design  in  a  number  of  ways.
20  In  this  paper,  I  will  use  two 
different regression-discontinuity methods. The first will only use within-municipality 
variation to identify the council-size effect on government size. The second method is to 
restrict the sample around the points of discontinuities, which means that the inference 
will be based on the cross-sectional information instead.  
Within-unit method 
The within-regression-discontinuity method amounts to use observational units with a 
rule-triggered change in the variable of interest for to identification. Hoxby (2000) argues 
that  the  this  method  is  “more  accurate  and  less  prone  to  bias  than  the  cross-section 
method.”  One  way  of  implementing  the  within-unit  method  is  to  include  fixed-
municipality  effects,  i.e.,  only  the  within-municipality  variation  is  being  used  for 
identification of the parameter of interest. In addition to the fixed municipality effects, a 
full set of time dummies will also be included since I do not want to attribute behavioral 
significance  to  any  across-municipality  correlations  that  are  really  due  to  common 
national  influences  such  as  the  effect  of  the  national  business  cycle.  The  identifying 
                                                 
19 Formally, this is a conditional mean independence assumption. 
20 Angrist and Lavy (1999), Hoxby (2000), and Pettersson-Lidbom (2002) are examples of some recent 





assumption  behind  the  within-municipality  regression-discontinuity  method  can  be 
expressed formally by first rewriting (3) as: 
 
git= mi + lt +d Nit + Xitb + uit,                                        (4) 
 
where i indexes a local government and t corresponds to time, mi is the fixed municipality 
effect, lt is the fixed time effect, Xit is a vector of other covariates, uit is an i.d.d. error 
term, git is the measure of the size of government, and Nit is the council size. The council-
size parameter d is the structural parameter of interest. The vast variation in legislature-
size is probably endogenous since it is the result of choices made by the legislatures 
themselves. Therefore, we need to isolate the part this is arguably exogenous. We do this 
by using the statutory law to create instrumental variables as previously defined. The 
instrumental variable approach can now be formally explained by writing the reduced 
form or the “first stage” equation for the endogenous variable Nit as: 
 




￿  + 
￿ it,                            (5)                                                                     
 
where the error term 
￿ it is defined as the residual from the population regression of Nit on 
Xit, lt, mi and the instruments: Z41it, Z51it, and Z61it . The validity of the instruments can 
now be stated as follows: once we control for Xit, lt, and mi, this will partial out any other 
effects between the instruments and the size of government. Since instrumental validity is 
the key to get unbiased estimate of the parameter of interest d some comments about the 
empirical specification is warranted. 
The advantage of using the within-municipality variation, as discussed above, is 
that the council size is only identified when there is a rule-triggered change in the size of 
the  council.  In  other  words,  this  means  that  the  council-size  parameter  will  only  be 
identified when a municipality actually was forced to change its council size because the 
number of eligible voters passed one of the three thresholds: 12,000, 24,000 or 36,000. 
This  will  turn  out  to  be  important  piece  of  information  in  bolstering  a  causal 
interpretation of my findings. At the thresholds of 12,000, no municipality had to change 
its council size due to the law. This particular fact gives an opportunity of refuting a 





council-size and the size of government at this particular threshold. The null hypothesis 
of no effect can be tested empirically by looking at the links (i.e. the reduced forms) from 
the instruments to government size and number of council members. 
The instruments are explicitly constructed from information about the relationship 
between the number of eligible voters and the minimum requirement of the council-size 
members stated in the law.  This is distinct from a conventional instrumental variable 
approach. For this reason it might be necessary to include a smooth function of number of 
eligible voters in the vector of covariates Xit. In our case, one may believe there to be 
economies of scale in the production of local public goods. Therefore, we may expect the 
number of eligible voters to be related to the size government as the number of eligible 
voters is highly correlated with population size. Because of this concern, I control for a 
cubic in the number of eligible voters. In other words, I assume that there is a smooth 
relationship between the number of eligible voters and the size of government, which is 
sufficiently captured by a third order polynomial function. 
Finally,  I  include  a  number  of  covariates  in  Xit  considered  a  standard  set  of 
controls  in  the  local  public  finance  literature:  proportion  of  people  of  age  0  to  15, 
proportion of people older than 65, population size, income, and grants-in-aid.  
Cross-section method 
The  most  common  regression-discontinuity  approach  is  to  rely  exclusively  on 
information in the cross-section. However, the drawback of this method is that we need to 
get really close to the discontinuity to avoid any bias, as discussed by Hoxby (2000). This 
method is also subject to more sampling variability than the within-unit method.
21 The 
cross-section method used here treats the panel data as though they were cross-section 
data and actual changes in the council size were not observed.  A crucial question is thus 
how close the observations must be to the discontinuities to avoid bias. For example, 
Angrist  and  Lavy  (1999)  restrict  the  sample  to  less  than  12.5  percent  from  the 
                                                 
21 In the within-unit approach we are using fixed effects and they will effectively reduce the variance of the 
error term leading to more precise estimates. In practice this could be quite important since the regression-
discontinuity method has such large sampling variability due to that is a correlated design. The standard 
errors in a correlated design can be much larger compared to an uncorrelated design, i.e., a randomized 
experiment. The larger is the correlation between the assignment variable and the treatment indicator the 
larger the variance of the estimate. In other words, much more observations are needed in the regression-
discontinuity design to give the same precision as in an experiment. A detailed discussion of efficiency of 





discontinuities in their preferred regressions. To avoid any potential bias I will restrict the 
empirical analysis to intervals that are quite close to the discontinuities. I will work with 
three  different  sub  samples.  In  the  first  sub  sample  I  have  restricted  to  +/-500  (i.e., 
{[11,500-12,500],  [23,500-24,500],  [35,500-36,500]})  eligible  voters  around  the 
discontinuities. However this will lead to relatively more observations in the intervals 
around the smaller discontinuities. Therefore, in the second sub sample, I restrict the 
sample to 5 percent (i.e., {[11,400-12,600], [22,800-24,200], [34,200-37,800]}) around 
the  discontinuities.  In  the  third  sub  sample,  I  restrict  the  samples  to  3  percent  (i.e.,  
{[11,640-12,360], [23,280-24,720], [34,920-37,080]}) from the discontinuities. Since all 
observations  in  the  samples  are  quite  close  to  the  discontinuities,  the  instrumental 
variables should now be valid even without controlling for the number of eligible voters 
or any other covariates. The only controls are time effects and indicators for the interval 
around each discontinuity. Since there are three discontinuities there need to be only two 
indicator variables. For example, in the first sub-sample the two indicator variables will 








24,500].  In  this  setup  any 
constant difference across the thresholds will not contribute to identifying the council-
size effect. In other words, I control for fixed-threshold effects and therefore this cross-
section  estimator  is  constructed  from  simple  comparison  of  means  around  each 
discontinuity. The idea with this setup is to mimic block randomization (i.e., stratified 
randomized  experiment),  i.e.,  council  size  is  randomly  assigned  within  each  group 
(interval) defined by the indicator variables and the assignment probability is allowed to 
differ from one group to the next. 
4. Data  
Before turning to the description of the data it is perhaps helpful to digress briefly on the 
workings of Swedish local governments. Local governments play an important role in the 
Swedish economy, both in terms of the allocation of functions among different levels of 
government  and  economic  significance.  They  are,  for  example,  responsible  for  the 
provision  of  day  care, education,  care  of  the  elderly, and social  welfare  services. To 
quantify their economic importance, we can note that in the 1980s and 1990s their share 





percent of the total Swedish workforce. Swedish local governments also have a large 
degree of autonomy. They have the constitutional right of self-government, they have no 
restrictions on borrowing, and they have no balanced budget rules.
22 Moreover, the bulk 
of  revenues  are  raised  trough  a  proportional  income  tax,  which  each  municipality  is 
allowed to set freely,
23 and only 20 percent of the revenues come from intergovernmental 
grants.  
  There is also a considerable variation in both expenditures and revenues across 
municipalities. For example, during the period 1974 to 1998, real expenditure per capita 
was  on  average  SEK  29,174  ($  4862),  the  standard  deviation  6,015  ($1,000),  the 
minimum value 14,392 ($ 2,400), and maximum value 70,032 ($ 11,672).
24 The data 
used in the empirical analysis consists of 288 municipalities between 1974 and 1998.
25 
The statutory law regulating the minimum council-size requirement has however only 
been in affect since 1977, and it was not after the election in year 1979 that municipalities 
had to comply with it. Therefore, some of the empirical analysis is restricted to the period 
1980 to 1998. In particular, this concerns the instrumental variable regressions. Table 2 
shows the descriptive statistics of the actual size of the local council grouped by segments 
with a minimum requirement of council sizes of 31, 41, 51 and 61. We can see that many 
municipalities have chosen to have more council members than required by law. This is 
particularly true for the ones with a requirement of at least 31 members. On average, this 
group  had  slightly  more  than  40  seats.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  the 
municipalities that were forced to change their council size due to the statutory law are 
the ones who will help identify the council-size parameter in the within-unit regression-
discontinuity approach. Table 3 presents data on those municipalities that passed one of 
the  three  thresholds:  12,000,  24,000  or  36,000  of  eligible  voters,  during  the  sample 
period. No municipality was forced to change its council-size at the lowest threshold, 
whereas 12 and 6 municipalities had to change its number of seats for the middle and 
highest cutoffs, respectively. Thus, 18 municipalities, which constitute 6.25 percent of the 
                                                 
22 However, from year 2000 there is a balanced budget rule.  
23 From 1991 to 1993, however, the central government imposed a temporary tax cap.  
24 The expenditures are expressed in 1991 prices using the implicit GDP deflator. The deflator is 
constructed by taking the ratio of GDP at current market prices to GDP at fixed market prices. The 
equivalent amount in dollars is shown within parentheses. 





entire sample, will identify the council-size effect in the within-unit method. In the cross-
section discontinuity method too, the number of useful observations will also be quite 
small: around 5-8 percent of all available observation. This large reduction in the number 
of observations used for identifying the effect of interest is typical for the regression-
discontinuity design and is the “price we have to pay” for isolating an exogenous source 
of variation. 
As discussed previously, that no municipality changed its council-size at 12,000 
creates  an  opportunity  of  refuting  a  causal  interpretation  of  the  relationship  between 
council-size  and  size  of  government.  In  other  words,  there  should  be  no  association 
between the size of government and the council-size at this particular discontinuity.  
Table 4 present summary statistics for the whole sample. All the data used are 
publicly available and were obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB) or its publications.
26 
5. Results 
In this section I present results on the relationship between council size and government 
size. Before showing the results for the two regression discontinuity methods described in 
section 3, I present results for a few methods that have previously been used, despite the 
inferential problems associated with these approaches. These results may bee seen as a 
benchmark for assessing potential biases in previous work. 
A. Results from previously used methods of identification 
Table 5 presents OLS estimates without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. These 
estimates  show  a  strong  positive  correlation  between  council  size  and  the  size  of 
government.  The  estimates  are  very  precisely  measured  when  only  time  effects  are 
included as controls. Columns 1 and 2 show that spending and revenues increase with 
SEK 130 per capita (i.e., 0.5 percent of total spending or revenues) for each additional 
council  member.  Including  a  full  set  of  covariates,  the  estimated  council-size  effect 
decreases to SEK 30 per capita, but are still statistically significant. These results are 
therefore consistent with previous estimates in the literature that rely on cross-section 
variation and not taking heterogeneity or simultaneity into account. 
                                                 
26 The publications used are: How much do local public services cost in Sweden, Local government 





Table 6 shows the OLS estimates when we control for unobserved heterogeneity 
by including fixed municipality effects. In contrast to Table 5, the estimated council-size 
effects are now all negative. Without any control variables, they are large (SEK -200 per 
capita) and significant, but controlling for the additional covariates makes them much 
smaller and not significantly different from zero. 
B. Results from the within-unit method 
In this section, I present reduced-form results between the instruments and council-size 
and between the instruments and spending and revenues. These reduced-form estimates 
provide evidence of the strength of the instruments and whether the instruments can be 
considered as valid. Table 7 presents the results of both the dummy instruments (the first 
three columns) as well as the single instrument (the last three columns) since there is a 
trade off between bias and efficiency when more than one instrument is being used, as 
discussed  in  section  3.  Table  7  also  presents  results  when  controlling  for  a  smooth 
function of the number of eligible voters by using a third order polynomial.   
In the dummy instruments case (the first column), we can see that the instruments 
are  strongly  related  to  council  size  except  for  Z41.  The  instruments,  Z51  and  Z61  are 
positively and highly significantly (with t-values of 10 and 14 respectively) related to the 
number council seats. A test of instrument relevance shows that these instruments are not 
“weak”. The F-statistic is 86.10, which is much higher than 10, the rule of thumb value 
suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). In the single instrument case, the F-statistic is 14, 
which is also suggestive of a strong instrument. Column 3 shows that the rule-triggered 
change in council size at the discontinuity 24,000 was 2.9, whereas at the discontinuity 
36,000 the change was 7.6. For the single instrument, column 4 shows that the average 
change was 0.24 members. 
Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table 7 also reveal a large and negative relation between 
the instruments and the policy outcomes except for Z41. In the dummy instruments case, 
the estimate of Z51 is significantly different from zero  at the 1 percent level and the 
estimate of Z61 is almost significant at 10 percent level. However, the estimate of Z41 is 
small and not significantly different from zero. As previously noted, no municipality was 
forced to change its council size at the threshold of 12,000 eligible voters. Thus, the 





between council size and size of government since the specification test suggests that 
factors other than council-size law are not responsible for the correlation between the size 
of government and the other instruments. As discussed in section 3, we can construct 
simple  Wald-type  or  IV  estimates.  For  example,  dividing  the  spending  and  revenue 
effects in column 2 and 3 by the council-size effect in column 1 leads to an estimated 
council-size effect on spending and revenues of -1,422/2.93= -485 and –1,472/2.93= -502 
respectively when Z51 is used as an instrument. Using Z61 as an instrument leads to an 
estimate of –985/7.57= -130 and –869/7.57= -114 on spending and revenues respectively. 
Thus, it seems that the relationship might be nonlinear since the estimates differ with 
respect to the instrument being used. However, even if the structural relationship between 
the council size and the government size is nonlinear, using all instruments produces a 
linear combination of the Wald estimates and captures an average effect of economic 
interest (e.g., see Angrist et al., 2000, and Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999). To summarize, 
the reduced form results from Table 7 suggest a direct and negative relationship between 
council size and the size of  government, but we now turn to two-stage least squares 
regressions. 
Table 8 shows the results from the two-stage least squares estimates. The first 
four  columns  show  the  estimate  of  the  effect  of  the  council-size  on  spending  and 
revenues from both single and dummy instrument without controlling for the number of 
eligible  voters,  whereas  the last four  columns  show  the result  from  using  a  qubic in 
eligible voters. The point estimates are roughly SEK –130 per capita for both spending 
and  revenues  in  both  the  single  and  dummy  instruments  regressions,  whereas  the 
estimates are in the range of -150 to -220 when controlling for a third-order polynomial 
in the number of eligible voters. Thus, it seems that the council-size effect is robust the 
parameterization of the variable that generates the discontinuities since the council-size 
estimates  are  roughly  similar  across  the  specifications.  Table  8  also  reveals  that  the 
standard errors are always larger in the single instrumental case compared to the dummy 
instrument case and that the point estimates of the council-size effect is typically larger 
than  in  the  dummy-instruments  regressions.  Thus,  this  observation  suggests  a  bias-
efficiency trade off of using multiple instruments as discussed in section 3. The point 





the number of instruments. By comparing the 2SLS estimate in Table 8 with the OLS 
estimate from the last two columns in Table 6, we can get a sense of the bias versus 
efficiency trade off. Table 8 reveals that the council-size estimates from the multiple-
instrument  regressions  might  be  more  biased  than  the  estimates  from  the  single 
instrument  regressions  since  the  estimates  from  the  former  are  closer  to  the  OLS 
estimates shown in Table 6, but the estimates are also less precisely measured in single-
instrument  regressions  compared  to  the  estimates  from  the  multiple-instrument 
regressions. Nevertheless, the estimates of the council-size effects from the various 2SLS 
regressions are never statistically significantly different from each other. Moreover, all 
the 2SLS estimates are significantly different from zero at conventional levels.  
The interpretation of the relation between council-size and government size as 
causal, relies on the identification assumption that there are no omitted time varying and 
municipality  specific  effects  correlated  with  the  discontinuities  induced  by  statutory 
council-size law. One potential important factor that could produce such a correlation is 
party  control.  As  noted  in  section  2,  the  simple  model  in  this  section  abstracts  from 
political parties in the budget process. However, since strong parties may have an affect 
on the common pool problem we also may need to control for party identity. I include an 
indicator for partisanship (e.g. left or right majority) and polynomials in vote shares. In 
other words, I add the same covariates used by Pettersson-Lidbom (2002b) in his tests for 
whether  party  control  matters  for  fiscal  policy  choices  using  a  sharp  regression-
discontinuity design. Table 9 presents a two-stage least square specification that includes 
these set of controls. The point estimates of the council-size effect are unaffected by the 
inclusion of partisanship. This finding is quite important since the instruments should be 
as good as randomly assigned and therefore unrelated to both observed and unobserved 
factors related to the size of government. Thus, this finding lends further credibility to 
that the instruments are exogenous. 
C. Results from the cross-section method 
Table 10, present the results from the cross-sectional regression-discontinuity method, 
i.e., when the sample has been restricted around the discontinuity points: 12,000, 24,000 
and 36,000. All specifications only include fixed threshold effects and time effects as 





discontinuity in order to get unbiased estimates. I have therefore experimented with a 
number of intervals around the discontinuities: +/-500, 5 % and 3 %.  As can be seen 
from table 10, in each sub sample the estimated effect on the council size on the size of 
government is always negative. The estimated effect is basically in the range of –200 to – 
500 SEK per capita, for both spending and revenues. The effects are also statistically 
significant in the 5% sample and for spending in the 500-sample. Thus, the negative 
estimates of the council-size effect are consistent with the results from the within-unit 
regression discontinuity method, although some of the estimates are twice as large. This 
finding also consistent with that the estimates from the regression discontinuity method 
based on the cross section information is much less precisely measured than the estimates 
from the within method as was discussed in section 3. 
6. Discussion  
The last section established empirically a negative relation between the size of legislature 
and the size of government using data from Swedish local governments. I interpret the 
negative council-size effect as causal. In other words, I claim that my findings to be 
internally valid since I am using a source of exogenous variation to identify the council-
size effect. The negative relationship between the number of legislators and the size of 
government implies rejection of the prediction from the common-pool model in section 2. 
A potential critique that can be raised against my results is that the common-pool model 
does  not  apply  to  the  Swedish  political  system,  since  it  is  based  on  proportional 
representation, whereas the classic work by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson (1981) was 
developed for a first-the-post-system with one-seat electoral districts. In other words, in 
their model N was referring to the number of districts, which happens to coincide with the 
number of legislators in a first-past-the post system. However, I believe the common-pool 
model could still be expected to apply in the Swedish context.  
The two key factors in a common-pool model are the number of participants in 
the budget decision and generalized taxation, and not the number of districts per se.
27 
                                                 
27 Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) identify two basic determinants of the degree of overspending bias due to 
the common pool problem. The number of decisions-makers and the structure of the process were they 
interact. Since there is no institutional variation in the budget process across the municipalities, this factor 





Swedish local governments do raise the bulk of revenues through a proportional income 
tax, i.e., a broad based tax base, and the budget must be approved by majority of the 
council members. Thus, as long as individual members of the council can marginally 
influence the budget outcome and they have different preferences about public goods, it 
is quite likely that the members might view the tax base as a common pool, and thus give 
rise to an overspending bias. This in turn raises the issue whether a political system with 
strong parties as the Swedish one allows for individual policymakers to affect the budget. 
The  result  presented  in  this  paper  provides  support  that  they  do  have  an  impact 
independent of party control. Support for this claim is also evidenced by the fact that the 
inclusion of party control does not affect the council-size estimate at all, which is to be 
expected since the instruments constructed from the council-size law are based on the 
assumption  that  they  should  be  as  good  as  randomly  assigned  and  therefore  be 
uncorrelated with both observed and unobserved determinants of the outcome. Moreover, 
since each party gets seats in proportion to its vote share, the relative strength between 
the ruling majority and its opposition is held constant when the council size is changed. 
In other words, the balance of power between different political parties in a council is not 
affected when additional council members is added to the council. Thus, this feature of 
the Swedish proportional election system gives an additional argument why the size of 
the council size and strength of parties should be unrelated.
 28 
Whether  we  can  interpret  the  negative  relationship  between  council  size  and 
government size as evidence against the common pool model obviously hinges on the 
interpretation of N. However, if one were to raise concerns about the use of the number of 
seats as a measure for N in my study, the same critique must also be raised against all the 
previous studies since they have equated N with the number of seats in the legislature.
29 
In addition, even for those studies based on U.S. data the mapping between the number of 
districts and the number of legislators is far from one to one.
30 For example, in Baqir 
(2002) less than 17 percent of the cities have council members elected from different 
                                                 
28 This feature of the council size law avoids the problem, pointed out by Inman and Fitts (1990), of having 
to rely on a particular hypothesis about how legislature’s do their business, i.e., whether legislatures operate 
under a norm of universalism (leading to 1/N), or whether strong parties internalize fiscal spillovers across 
party members (giving M/N where M is the number of members in the majority party). 
29 The only exception is Perroti and Kontpoulos (2002). They use the number of spending ministers in the 
cabinet as a measure of N. 






31 whereas the majority of cities instead have at-large systems. 
Baqir  also  finds  that  the  council  size  effect  does  not  depend on the  type  of  election 
system. 
To generalize my findings to other settings one need not only tie my findings to 
theory, but also establish whether the range of variation used to identify the effect of 
council size on the size of government is similar to other settings as well. The range of 
variation used to identify the effect is between 31 and 61, with an average size of 47. This 
is much larger than city councils in the U.S., which have an average  of 7 members. 
However, cities like New York, NY (36), Stamford, CT (40) and Chicago, IL (50) are in 
the relevant range. For the U.S states, the average size of the upper house is 40 which put 
them in the relevant range, whereas the lower house is off the mark with an average of 
116 legislators. Most countries also have larger legislatures: an average of 122 in the 
upper  house  and  an  average of  281  in the  lower  house,  but  countries  like  Australia, 
Norway, Austria and Switzerland, all have upper houses of similar sizes to Swedish local 
governments. 
To  summarize,  my  result  seem  to  be  at  odds  with  common-pool  model.  The 
question is now whether we can we find an alternative explanation that could explain the 
negative relationship between the size of the legislature and the size of  government? 
Unfortunately, I am not aware of such models so my results constitute a challenge for 
future theoretical work. Perhaps, ideas or models from the social interactions literature 
may  give some clues for possible explanations of the negative relationship since this 
literature explicitly deals with group interactions.
32 The council effect identified in this 
paper is an example of such a group effect. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Previous  empirical  studies  have  found  a  positive  relation  between  the  size  of  the 
legislature  and  the  size  of  government.  Those,  studies,  however,  do  not  adequately 
                                                 
31 There are cities with both single member and multimember districts among the 17 percent with district 
electoral system. Unfortunately, Bagir treats all cities as having single-member districts since his data does 
not allow him to separate them apart. 





address the concerns of simultaneity, selection, and omitted-variable bias. To isolate an 
exogenous  variation  in  the  size  of  the  legislature,  this  paper  exploits  a  statutory  law 
linking council size to the number of eligible voters in Swedish local governments. The 
statutory law creates discontinuities between number of eligible voters and council size, 
which are used to construct instrumental variable estimates of the effect of council size 
on government size. In contrast to previous findings, the results show an increase of the 
council size to induce a significant and substantial decrease in spending and revenues. On 
average, spending and revenues go down by about 0.5-0.8 percent for each additional 
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Table 1. Minimum council size and the number of eligible voters 
 
Minimum requirement of council size  Number of eligible voters 
31  Less than 12,000  
41  12,001 – 24,000 
51  24,001 – 36,000 
61  More than 36,000 












St. Dev.  Min   Max 
31  40.23  5.20  31  49 
41  47.62     4.20        41  61 
51  52.67     4.23          51    75 
61  67.05  7.78           61  85           
101  101  0  101  101 
                   
 
 
Table 3.  Information about the discontinuities 1980-1998 
 
Discontinuities (Number of 
eligible voters)  
Number of municipalities 
that crossed a discontinuity  
Number of municipalities 
that had to change their 
council size due to the law  
12,000  15  0 
24,000  17  12 





Table 4. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables  Mean  Standard d.  Min  Max 
Council size  47.55    11.06          31  101 
Number of 
eligible voters 
22,818    42,430       2,286       562,591 
Spending  29,174     6,015    14,392   70,032  
Revenues  29,083     5,929     15,515     71,699 
Proportion of 
young, 0-15 
21.05  2.69  12.65  36.69 
Proportion of 
old, 65+ 
17.79  4.22  3.27  28.14 
Income  72,624  12,357  15,945  162,962 
Population size  29,923  53,074  2,865  727,339 
Grants-in-aid  2,589  2,598  -4,749  19599 











Table 5. Council size and the size of government: OLS estimates  
 
  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues 




























Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.3705  0.3725  0.6100  0.6183 
Number of 
observations 
7,051  7,050  7,051  7,050 






Table 6. Council size and the size of government: fixed-effect estimates 
 
  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues 






























Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 within  0.6409  0.6436  0.6799  0.6856 
Number of 
observations 
7,051  7,050  7,051  7,050 







Table 7. Reduced form estimates  
 
  Council 
size 
Spending  Revenues  Council 
size 
Spending  Revenues 






     






     























































































































Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.9860  0.8316  0.8316  0.9853  0.8310  0.8375 
Number of 
observations 
5,403  5,389  5,389  5,403  5,389  5,389 
Notes: Estimates are based on Swedish municipality data for 1980-1998. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.Table 8. Council size and the size of government: Two-Stage Least Square estimates 
 
  Dummy IV  Single IV  Dummy IV  Single IV 
  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues 
















Eligible voters          -.112 
(.124)     
-.206 













Cubic          3.05e-12 



























































































Municipality effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389 
Notes: Estimates are based on Swedish municipality data for 1980-1998. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
       Table 9. Council size and the size of government: adding party control and vote shares 
 
  Dummy IV  Single IV  Dummy IV  Single IV 
  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues 

















See Table 8 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389  5,389 









+/- 500   5 percent   3 percent  
  Dummy IV  Single IV  Dummy IV  Single IV  Dummy IV  Single IV 
  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues  Spending  Revenues 












































































Time effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of 
observations 
302  302  302  302  593  593  593  593  342  342  342  342 
Notes: Estimates are based on Swedish municipality data for 1980-1998. Robust-standard errors are in parentheses.  
 